No Sanctions for Vessel Carrying Shark Fins by Schaffner, Alicia
Roger Williams University
DOCS@RWU
Sea Grant Law Fellow Publications Marine Affairs Institute
7-2008
No Sanctions for Vessel Carrying Shark Fins
Alicia Schaffner
Follow this and additional works at: https://docs.rwu.edu/law_ma_seagrant
Part of the Admiralty Commons, Environmental Law Commons, Fourteenth Amendment
Commons, and the Natural Resources Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Marine Affairs Institute at DOCS@RWU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Sea Grant
Law Fellow Publications by an authorized administrator of DOCS@RWU. For more information, please contact mwu@rwu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Schaffner, Alicia, "No Sanctions for Vessel Carrying Shark Fins" (2008). Sea Grant Law Fellow Publications. 32.
https://docs.rwu.edu/law_ma_seagrant/32
New Jersey v. Delaware, 128 S. Ct. 1410 (U.S.
2008).
Joseph Rosenblum, J.D.
For the third time in 130 years, the Supreme
Court has ruled on a boundary dispute between
the State of New Jersey and the State of
Delaware concerning jur-
isdiction over activities in
the Delaware River. In
1877, fishing rights
were the issue. In 1934,
it was a disagreement
over oysters. In the most
recent incarnation of
New Jersey v. Delaware,
the Supreme Court ad-
dressed the authority of
Delaware to deny per-
mits for and prevent
construction of a lique-
fied natural gas (“LNG”)
plant proposed by British
Petroleum and approved by
New Jersey.1
Background
The LNG plant, along with storage
tanks and other structures, was to be
located in New Jersey. However, its
erection and operation would have
required dredging in parts of the
Delaware River and construction of a
2,000-foot pier extending roughly 1,500-feet
towards Delaware. The LNG plant was ap-
proved by both the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission and New Jersey. British Petroleum
also sought permits from Delaware because the
pier extended into the state’s submerged lands.
Delaware denied the request, determining that
the LNG plant was a heavy industry facility
within Delaware’s coastal zone,
and thus was prohibited under
Delaware’s Coastal Zone Act.
In 2005, invoking the
Supreme Court’s “original jur-
isdiction” for disputes between
states, New Jersey brought suit
against Delaware challenging
Delaware’s authority to deny
the LNG plant. The Supreme
Court appointed a special master
to review the issues, and in April
2007 the special master filed a
report agreeing with Delaware’s
interpretations of a 1905 Compact
between the two states, and con-
cluding that Delaware had the
authority to deny construction
of the LNG plant. The special
master’s recommendation in such a
case is nonbinding, and the
Supreme Court subsequently
heard the case, with Justice
Stephen Breyer recusing him-
self because he owns British
Petroleum stock.
Supreme Court Finds New Jersey
and Delaware Share Jurisdiction
Legal Reporter for the National Sea Grant College Program 
The
Volume 7:2, July 2008
See Shared Jurisdiction, page 2
Map of Delaware River Basin courtesy of 
the State of New Jersey.
Riparian Rights
Under a 1934 Supreme Court case, Delaware
owns the entire river and riverbed along the
impacted portion of the Delaware River, from
the Delaware shore to the low-water mark on
the New Jersey bank. However, jurisdictional
authority is significantly complicated by a 1905
compact between the two states that provides
that “each state may, on its own side of the river,
continue to exercise riparian jurisdiction of
every kind and nature.”2 Citing this agreement
as to “riparian jurisdiction” under the compact,
New Jersey thus argued that it had the sole
right to approve development projects extend-
ing into the river, even though Delaware
retained control and ownership of the river
itself. Delaware on the other hand asserted reg-
ulatory authority over structures located within
its boundaries, including those portions of the
River adjudged to be part of Delaware under
the 1934 decision.
The Court ultimately ruled 6-2 in favor of
Delaware with Justice Ginsburg penning the
decision for the Court. According to the Court,
New Jersey retained ordinary riparian rights;
however, its jurisdiction under the compact is
not exclusive over unusual or extraordinary
projects. Distinguishing the term “riparian
jurisdiction” from the broader term “exclusive
jurisdiction,” used in similar compacts, the
Shared Jurisdiction, from page 1
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Court held that New Jersey and Delaware have
overlapping authority to regulate riparian pro-
jects of extraordinary character extending off-
shore of New Jersey’s domain into the river over
which Delaware is sovereign.
The Court found that the proposed LNG
plant “goes well beyond the ordinary or usual.”3
The court noted that two or three supertankers
would arrive for unloading each week surround-
ed by a moving safety zone that would restrict
other vessels 3,000 feet ahead and behind, and
1,500 feet to the sides. While in transit, these
tankers would pass densely populated areas. 
The Court also found noteworthy that New
Jersey had in the past admitted Delaware’s per-
mitting authority over projects in the Delaware
River. For example, in 1980 New Jersey submit-
ted a coastal management plan to the Secretary of
Commerce stating “that any New Jersey project
extending beyond mean low water must obtain
coastal permits from both states.”4 Similarly,
New Jersey itself had sought Delaware’s approval
to refurbish a stone pier located in the Delaware
River and extending past the low-water mark on
the New Jersey shore. 
Conclusion
In a scathing dissent, Justice Scalia, joined by
fellow New Jersey native Justice Alito, ques-
tioned the Court’s defini-
tion of extraordinary, ask-
ing whether “a pink
wharf, or a zig-zagged
wharf qualify?”5 Justice
Scalia suggested that rather
than using established
legal principles, the Court
reached its conclusion
based on environmental
concerns, noting that “if
New Jersey had approved a
wharf of equivalent dimen-
sions, to accommodate
tankers of equivalent size,
carrying tofu and bean
sprouts, Delaware could not
have interfered.”6
Delaware’s victory will keep British
Petroleum’s LNG plant from locating in the
contested site. Whether the plant will be relo-
cated to another site, as is suggested by the
majority, or whether New Jersey will be left
without the economic benefits promised by
such a large development, as expressed by the
dissent, is still unclear. As a practical matter, by
finding against New Jersey, the Court seems to
have recognized Delaware’s jurisdiction to
apply its environmental laws and regulations to
similar projects extending from the New Jersey
side of the river.
Endnotes
1.  Delaware’s denial of a permit to construct
the LNG plant was met with threats from
New Jersey of withdrawing state pension
funds from Delaware banks, which in turn
prompted Delaware to considered authoriz-
ing the National Guard to more aggressively
protect its border. New Jersey v. Delaware,
128 S. Ct. 1410, 1418 (U.S. 2008).
2.  New Jersey v. Delaware, 128 S. Ct. 1410 (U.S.
2008).
3.  Id. at 1427.
4.  Id. at 1426.
5.  Id. at 1437 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
6.  Id. at 1439.
Photograph of LNG terminal courtesy of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC).
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Pacific Merchant Shipping Association v.
Goldstene, 517 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2008).
Terra Bowling, J.D. 
The Ninth Circuit has ruled that California’s
regulations limiting emissions from ships are
preempted by the Clean Air Act (CAA). The
court found that the California Air Resources
Board (Board) must obtain permission from the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) before
adopting standards related to the control of
emissions from vehicles and engines. 
Background
The CAA amendments of 1990 regulate emis-
sions of nonroad sources, including marine ves-
sels. The amendments preempt state regulation
of certain sources; however, Section 209(e)(2) of
the CAA allows California to regulate other
nonroad engines and vehicles if it obtains
authorization from the EPA prior to enforce-
ment. In this instance, the Board did not obtain
EPA authorization prior to enforcing its Marine
Vessel Rules.
The rules limit emissions from the auxiliary
diesel engines of oceangoing vessels within 24
miles of the state’s coast. The rules regulate the
emission of particulate matter, nitrogen oxide,
and sulfur oxide, specifying that the emissions
may not exceed the emission rates that would
result from the vessel using certain (listed) fuels
with a sulfur content of no more than 0.5% by
weight. The rules exempt certain vessels,
including vessels passing through the regulated
waters but not entering or stopping at a port in
California and vessels owned or operated by any
federal, state, local, or foreign government. 
After the Board began enforcing the rules in
January, the Pacific Merchant Shipping
Association (PMSA) brought suit alleging that
the regulations were preempted by the Clean Air
Act (CAA) and the Sub-
merged Lands Act. The
United States District Court
for the Eastern District of
California found that the reg-
ulations were emissions stan-
dards and were preempted by
§ 209(e)(2) of the CAA. The
court granted summary judg-
ment to PMSA on the CAA
claim, but did not rule on the
Submerged Lands Act claim. 
Preemption
The Board and other groups
appealed the decision, argu-
ing that the Marine Vessel
Rules were not within the
scope of § 209(e)(2), which
requires California to obtain
See Emissions, page 18
California’s Emissions 
Regulations Preempted
Photograph courtesy of the ©Nova Development Corp.
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Fishing Company of Alaska, Inc. v. Gutierrez, 510
F.3d 328 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
Sara Wilkinson, 3L, University of Mississippi
When the Secretary of Commerce (Secretary),
acting through the National Marine Fisheries
Service (NMFS), enacted regulations creating a
minimum “groundfish retention standard” for
the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands fisheries,
an Alaskan fishing company challenged the reg-
ulations. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia ruled in favor of the com-
pany and ordered that the monitoring and
enforcement (M&E) requirements be vacated. 
Background
The seas off the Alaskan coast play host to a
wide variety of groundfish.1 Commercial fishing
vessels on the Bearing Sea and around the
Aleutian Islands catch the groundfish using
large nets or “trawls” to drag the ocean floor.
Unwanted groundfish, known as “bycatch,” are
often mixed in the trawls with more commer-
cially desirable species and are thrown back into
the ocean dead or dying.
In 1996, in an attempt to minimize the envi-
ronmental effect of large bycatch, Congress
added a goal of minimizing bycatch in the for-
mal statement of policy in the Magnuson-
Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management
Act (MSA). The North Pacific Fishery
Management Council (Council), a regional
body created by the MSA, must implement such
congressional policies within its region by
developing fishery management plans (FMPs)
and amendments.2
In its June 2003 meeting, the Council adopt-
ed an Amendment3 to the regional FMP sup-
porting the idea of a minimum groundfish
retention standard through the imposition of
economic disincentives on vessels with high
bycatch rates. The Council also approved an
outline for the implementation of the
Amendment through regulatory measures.
Measures requiring vessels to keep observers on
board to monitor bycatch and the use of certi-
fied scales to weigh fish were included in the
outline.
On May 24, 2005, after drafting language for
the proposed regulation based on the Council’s
outline, NMFS forwarded the text of the pro-
posed regulation to the Council’s Executive
Director with instructions to submit all perti-
nent documents to the Secretary for review. The
draft text created by NMFS included three
M&E requirements that were not originally con-
sidered by the Council in its June 2003 meeting.
In April 2006, the Secretary issued a final rule
with regard to the Council’s FMP Amendment
that adopted the draft text created by NMFS,
including the three M&E requirements not con-
templated by the Council.
The Fishing Company of Alaska (FCA)
brought suit in district court charging that the
2006 rule establishing minimum “groundfish
retention standards” was unlawful because of its
addition of the three M&E requirements. In
addition, FCA alleged that the M&E require-
ments were substantively inconsistent with the
MSA’s “National Standards” for conservation.
The district court granted summary judgment
to the Secretary and FCA appealed. 
NMFS’s Addition of M&E Provisions
In the appeal, FCA did not challenge NMFS’s
role in drafting the language of the regulation,
but the substantive change in the language pre-
viously considered and approved by the
Council.4 The Secretary contended that the
MSA does not address the development process
of proposed regulations; therefore, the regula-
tion was properly submitted when the Executive
See Alaskan Fishing Company, page 6
Court Vacates Monitoring and
Enforcement Requirements
Director forwarded the pertinent documents
back to NMFS in May 2005. 
According to the MSA, the Council is re-
quired to submit proposed regulations which it
“deems necessary or appropriate for the purposes
of…implementing a fishery management plan or
plan amendment…simultaneously with the plan
or amendment”5 to the Secretary. The court noted
that even if the Executive Director’s actions could
be attributed to the Council, he did not deem the
three new M&E requirements “necessary or
appropriate” as required by MSA. Because the
Secretary did not have an indication that the plan
had been deemed necessary or appropriate, the
court found that the Secretary’s publication of the
rule was inconsistent with the law.
The court based their opinion on several
facts: (1) there was no indication that the
Council or anyone acting for the Council knew
that the M&E requirements existed or deemed
them necessary or appropriate; (2) NMFS’s let-
ter that accompanying the draft text called no
attention to the added provisions; (3) the
Executive Director made no note of the substan-
tive changes in his cover letter when he distrib-
uted the draft text to the Secretary per NMFS’s
instructions; (4) The Council’s Environmental
Assessment (EA) assumed the absence of the
added M&E provisions; and, (5) NMFS’s admis-
sion that the Council did not have the opportu-
nity to consider the new M&E provisions until
after final submission to the Secretary.
NMFS defended the three additional M&E
provisions as clarifications of details of the FMP
originally contemplated and passed by the
Council. In addition, the Secretary claimed that
the additions were not inconsistent with the
Council’s original regulatory outline for imple-
mentation of the FMP. The court dismissed these
arguments and held that the additional M&E
requirements were inconsistent with the Council’s
original outline to the point that they constituted
material additions to the Council’s amendment.
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See Alaskan Fishing Company, page 12
Photograph of Alaskan fishing boats courtesy of Valerie Craig/Marine Photobank.
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Southeastern Fed. Power Customers, Inc. v. Geren,
514 F.3d 1316 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
Terra Bowling, J.D. 
As a southeastern drought enters its third year,
there is no end in sight to an interstate feud
between Georgia, Florida, and Alabama over
federal water reservoirs located in Georgia. 
Water Crisis
At the source of the water wars is a limited water
supply and an increase demand for available
water. Metro-Atlanta depends on one reservoir,
manmade Lake Lanier, as its primary water
source. Lanier, which is operated by the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers, was formed by the
construction of the Buford Dam on the
Chattahoochee River northeast of Atlanta. The
Chattahoochee meets two other rivers, the Flint
River and the Apalachicola River, and flows
through Florida and into the Gulf of Mexico,
making up the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-
Flint river basin (ACF basin), which includes
several counties in Alabama. In addition to act-
ing as a water source for Georgia residents,
water flowing from the reservoir into Florida
helps protect the state’s oyster industry, as well
as several endangered species within the ACF
basin. In Alabama, water from the reservoir is
used to cool its power plants.
In the past few years, water levels in the
reservoir have dropped significantly, hitting
record lows. In addition to drought conditions,
the lake has lost water for other reasons. In
2006, at the same time the area began experi-
encing a serious drought, the Corps released
water from Lake Lanier and several other reser-
voirs to protect the federally protected Gulf
sturgeon.1 Simultaneously, a faulty gauge mea-
suring the lake’s elevation caused the Corps to
accidentally release more than 22 billion gallons
of water.2 Lake Lanier subsequently dropped
two feet and remains well below its normal
level.3
Georgia has attempted to offset the effects of
the decreased water supply. The state has enact-
ed a water ban on outdoor water use and
ordered local providers to reduce consumption
by 10%.4 Despite these efforts, the state’s—
especially Metro-Atlanta’s—water deficiency
remains critical. State officials argue that it can-
not spare to release more water than it is cur-
rently and would like the Corps to allot more of
the reservoir’s water for its needs. Florida and
Alabama, however, argue that more water
should be released from Lake Lanier and four
other federal reservoirs to protect endangered
species located in the ACF basin, as well as to
meet their industry, recreation, and commercial
fishing needs. 
Court Action
The feud between the three states began more
than two decades ago when Alabama sued the
Corps to stop the reallocation of water in Lake
Lanier from stored water to water supply. The
states subsequently reached a Memorandum of
Agreement and later signed the ACF Basin
Compact regarding water storage allocation,
planning, and dispute resolution. Both of the
agreements expired without a permanent solu-
tion in place.
Since then, multiple lawsuits have been
filed regarding water rights in the region.5 In
2003, Georgia sued the Corps for not reallocat-
ing reservoir storage space for local consump-
tion. As a result, Georgia entered into an agree-
ment with the Corps, which increased
Georgia’s share of the reservoir allocated for
water storage from 13.9% to 22.9%. Florida and
Alabama brought suit to invalidate the agree-
ment. In February, the D.C. appellate court
See Water Wars, page 8
Water Wars Continue in
Southeastern States
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invalidated the agreement, finding that the
Corps did not have the authority to grant
Georgia additional water rights without getting
approval from Congress.6 There are currently at
least eight pending lawsuits regarding water
rights in the region.7
Corps’ Plan
Meanwhile, in November 2007, the Corps began
holding more water in Lake Lanier in response
to the severe drought faced by the region.8
Florida and Alabama objected.9 The Governors
of the three states entered negotiations to find a
compromise, but in February, the talks broke
down, and the matter was left to be decided by
the Corps.10
In April, the Corps proposed a revised inter-
im operating plan that would be in effect until a
permanent plan could be developed. The inter-
im plan proposed decreasing the amount of
water released from Lanier. The Corps request-
ed a biological opinion (BiOp) from the Fish
and Wildlife Service (FWS) regarding the
effects of the plan on endangered species locat-
ed in Florida, including Gulf sturgeon and three
mussels. In June, the FWS issued a BiOp find-
ing that the plan would not affect the survival or
future recovery of the species.11 The plan
received final approval in June,
and Florida counties are calling
for the Governor to take legal
action objecting to the plan.12
Conclusion
With a long, dry summer pre-
dicted and an endless round
of lawsuits on the horizon, the
water wars seem likely to contin-
ue. The Corps is developing a
new water control plan for Lake
Lanier and the other federal
reservoirs, but the plan is not
expected to be complete for
three years.13 In the meantime,
court action may shape the
Corps’ plan and water allocation
in the region.
Endnotes
1.   Stacy Shelton, Corps Overtaps Lanier; New
Proposal Calls for Holding More Water in
Drought, THE ATLANTA JOURNAL-
CONSTITUTION, Apr. 16, 2008, at 1A.  
2.  Id.
3.  Id.
4.   Stacy Shelton, Perdue Wants to Relax Water
Rules, THE ATLANTA JOURNAL-
CONSTITUTION, Feb. 6, 2008.
5.   Ben Evans, Attention Shifts to Courts after
Talks Collapse, THE MOBILE PRESS REGISTER,
Mar. 9, 2008, at B5.
6.   Southeastern Fed. Power Customers, Inc. v.
Geren, 514 F3d 1316 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
7.   Evans.
8.   Shelton, supra note 1.
9.   Shelton, supra note 1.
10. Evans, supra note 5.
11. David Royse, Water Plan Won’t Doom 4
Species, THE MOBILE PRESS REGISTER, June
3, 2008, at B5.
12. Bruce Ritchie, Counties Ask Crist to Step up,
FLORIDA TODAY, June 13, 2008, at 8B.
13. Shelton, supra note 1.
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Photograph of drying banks of Lake Lanier courtesy of NOAA’s National
Weather Service Forecast Office.
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United States v. Approximately 64,695 Pounds of
Shark Fins, 520 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2008).
Alicia Schaffner, 2L, Roger Williams University
School of Law
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that
a company that chartered a vessel to purchase
and transport shark fins could not be sanctioned
under the Shark Finning Prohibition Act
(SFPA). The court held that enforcement of the
Act would result in a violation of due process,
since there was not enough notice that the char-
tered vessel would be included under the Act as
a “fishing vessel.” 
Background
In 2000, Congress enacted the SFPA as an
amendment to the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery
Conservation and Management Act to eliminate
the practice of shark finning. The Act makes it
illegal to remove fins from a shark and discard
its carcass at sea, to have these fins aboard a fish-
ing vessel without the carcass, and to land any fin
without the carcass.1
In 2002, Tai Loong Hong Marine Products,
Ltd. (TLH) chartered a United States vessel,
the King Diamond II (KD II), to meet a foreign
fishing vessel on the high seas, purchase shark
fins from the vessel, and deliver the fins to
TLH at a Guatemalan port. The KD II subse-
quently met with over twenty vessels on the
high seas and purchased approximately 64,695
pounds of shark fins. When the KD II was
approximately 250 miles off the coast of
Guatemala, the U.S. Coast Guard detained the
ship when it found shark fins aboard the vessel
without shark carcasses.
The United States government seized the
shark fins and brought a complaint for the for-
feiture of the shark fins. TLH did not contest
that the ship was carrying the shark fins, but its
classification as a fishing vessel. The company
claimed that the forfeiture of the shark fins
equaled a violation of due process. The district
court ordered that the fins be forfeited, and
TLH appealed.
On appeal, the first issue was whether the
definition of “fishing vessel” under the
Magnuson-Stevens Act gave sufficient notice to
TLH that the vessel’s activities would subject
the company to sanctions. The second issue was
whether the regulations applied to the KD II
since it acquired the fins while at sea and was
bound for Guatemala and not a United States
port. 
Due Process
To avoid a violation of due process, fair notice of
what conduct is prohibited must be given before
a sanction is imposed. Furthermore, the notice
must be explicit enough that a person of “ordi-
nary intelligence” would be able to know what
activity is forbidden and to act accordingly.2
The court agreed with TLH that there was a
violation of due process in this instance. There
was nothing in the statutes or regulations that
would have put TLH on notice that the vessel
they chartered would be considered a fishing ves-
sel as defined in the Magnuson-Stevens Act or
16 U.S.C. § 1802(18)(B). 
Under the Act, the term fishing vessel
includes any vessel that “aid[s] or assist[s]”
another vessel in any activity relating to fish-
ing.3 The court found that the KD II did not fall
under this part of the definition because their
activities of purchasing, storing, and transport-
ing the fins did not aid or assist the foreign ves-
sels in any fishing activities. The KD II was act-
ing for its own commercial purposes. The court
rejected the notion that the foreign vessels were
aided by being allowed to stay out at sea longer
to fish than they otherwise would have had the
See Shark Fins, page 10
No Sanctions for Vessel 
Carrying Shark Fins
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KD II not purchased the fins from them.
According to the court, any benefit that the for-
eign vessels derived was purely incidental. 
The court then looked at the implementing
regulations of the statute and concluded that
they do not provide fair notice of the KD II’s
status as a fishing vessel. The court looked at
two specific provisions within the regulation:
the possession prohibition and the landing pro-
hibition. The former prohibits the possession of
the fins without carcasses aboard U.S. fishing
vessels seaward of the inner boundary of the
U.S. EEZ. The regulations also prohibit the
landing of shark fins without carcasses by any
U.S. or foreign fishing vessel if they were har-
vested seaward of the inner boundary of the U.S.
EEZ, specifically including “any cargo vessel
that received shark fins from a fishing vessel at
sea” in its definition of fishing vessel.4 The gov-
ernment seized the fins under the possession
provision, which does not include a provision
regarding cargo vessels. Although the landing
provision prohibits possession on cargo vessels,
the U.S. government conceded that the landing
provision applied only to vessels landing in U.S.
ports, not foreign ports such as Guatemala
where the KD II was to land. Looking at the reg-
ulations together, the court found that they did
not provide notice that the KD II would be pro-
hibited from possessing fins for the purpose of
making a delivery to a foreign port.
Conclusion
Despite Congress’ intent to curtail the practice
of shark finning, the court found that under
these circumstances there was no notice that the
KD II could be considered a fishing vessel. Thus
TLH had no way of knowing that the actions of
the KD II (purchase, transportation, and storage
of shark fins without a carcass) would be pro-
hibited and subject to sanctions. Therefore,
there was a violation of due process when the
fins were subjected to forfeiture under SFPA.
Endnotes
1. United States v. Approximately 64,695 Pounds
of Shark Fins, 520 F.3d 976, 978 (9th Cir.
2008) quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1857(1)(P).
2.  Id. at 980.
3. Id.
4.  50 C.F.R. 600.1204.
Photograph of bags
of shark fins cour-
tesy of Jessica King,
Marine Photobank.
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Reino de Espana v. American Bureau of Shipping,
Inc., 528 F.Supp.2d 455 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
Sarah Spigener, 3L, University of Mississippi
School of Law
The District Court for the Southern District of
New York held that Spain is precluded from
bringing a negligence action in the United
States against the American Bureau of Ship-
ping, a classification society, as a result of the
Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution
Damage that regulates which countries may
hear such cases.
Background
In October 2002, the Prestige, an oil tanker, left
Russia and Latvia fully laden for Gibraltar.
During the voyage, the Prestige experienced
structural failures which, in November 2002,
resulted in the discharge of multiple tons of oil
into the ocean off the northwestern Spanish
coast. The disaster left a slick over 200 yards
wide and 18 miles long, and as the Prestige sank,
a second large oil slick formed.1 In total,
approximately three million gallons of fuel was
discharged into the environment.
Reino de Espana (“Spain”) brought suit
against the American Bureau of Shipping, Inc.
(“ABS”) seeking damages as a result of the oil
spill. Spain claimed that ABS negligently certi-
fied the Prestige as capable to carry fuel cargoes
and, as a result, is subject to civil damages. 
ABS is engaged in the business of deter-
mining the fitness of vessels through a proce-
dure called classification. ABS surveyors
inspect the vessel, and if the vessel is in com-
pliance with ABS standards, the vessel is
issued classification documents. Classification
by ABS is essential to the marketability of a
vessel for commercial shipping. The Prestige
was initially certified when it was built in 1973
and continued to be certified until it sank.
Analysis
When an oil shipping incident results in pollu-
tion damage in the territory of a signatory state,
the Convention on Civil Liability for Oil
Pollution Damage (CLC) imposes liability on the
owner of a vessel which was carrying oil as cargo
and exempts third parties unless they acted reck-
lessly. ABS moved for summary judgment claim-
ing that Spain could not prove the “reckless” con-
duct required to hold ABS liable. Secondly, ABS
claimed that under the CLC, Spain can only seek
damages in a country that is a signatory to the
CLC; consequently, since the United States is not
a signatory to the CLC, the U.S. does not have
proper jurisdiction to hear this case.
The court first looked at whether the CLC
was applicable to the case. ABS is classified,
under the CLC, as any “other person who…per-
formed services” for the Prestige. Because ABS
provided certification services to the Prestige,
ABS argues that Spain is subject to the limita-
tions imposed by the CLC. Spain argued in
response that the CLC is only intended to cover
individuals physically working on a vessel at the
time of a pollution incident and thus is inap-
plicable to ABS. The court however rejected this
argument by referring to the clear language of
the CLC and held that the CLC does govern
this situation.
Next, the court turned to the issue of
whether the CLC required Spain to bring its
claim in a contracting state. The court ex-
plained that the CLC creates legal obligations
analogous to contractual obligations on the
states that are parties to it. Since Spain is a con-
tracting state, it is subject to its limitations.
The CLC expressly provides that “actions for
See Oil Spill Case, page 12
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compensation may only be brought in the
Courts of any such Contracting State or States.”
Since the U.S. is not a contracting state to the
CLC, pursuing an action in the U.S. is a viola-
tion of the CLC. As a result, the court granted
ABS’s motion for summary judgment because
the court lacked jurisdiction to hear this case.
Conclusion
The Prestige sank and caused an international
environmental disaster by discharging nearly
three million gallons of oil into the ocean off
the coast of Spain. ABS certified that the
Prestige was capable of carrying oil cargoes,
when the ship was not structurally sound.
However, the court held that the U.S. may not
hear the case, since Spain is subject to the
terms and conditions of the CLC and the CLC
mandates that civil suits may only be brought
in signatory countries.
Endnotes
1.  The Prestige Oil Spill, TIME, available at
http://www.time.com/time/photoessays/oil-
spill/index.html .
Conclusion
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
found that the procedural inadequacy of the
Council’s action fatally tainted the three M&E
requirements added by NMFS to the Final
Rule. Under the law, the Secretary was
required to decide whether the entirety of the
proposed regulation had been lawfully submit-
ted and deemed “necessary or appropriate.”
The court found that the Secretary should have
required some indication that the Council
deemed the M&E requirements necessary or
appropriate prior to their submission as is
required by the MSA. In publishing the pro-
posed rule with the three additional M&E
requirements, the Secretary’s conduct was
inconsistent with law. As such, the court
deemed that FCA was entitled to relief,
reversed the district court’s summary judg-
ment to the Secretary and remanded the case
with instructions to strike the three disputed
M&E requirements from the final rule.
Endnotes
1. Groundfish are fish that spend most of their
lives on or near the ocean floor.
2. For an FMP or an amendment to an FMP to
take effect, it must first be submitted to the
Secretary for review of compliance with
applicable law and publication in the
Federal Register for public comment.
Throughout the review and public comment
process, the Secretary is bound by the judi-
cial review procedures of the Administrative
Procedure Act, namely a requirement that
the Secretary’s actions not be an “arbitrary
and capricious abuse of discretion…”
3. Amendment 79, See Groundfish Retention
Standard, 70 Fed. Reg. 35,054, 35,055 (June 16,
2005) see also Final Rule, 71 Fed. Reg. at 17,362.
4. NMFS acknowledged that the M&E require-
ments were not before the Council when it
took its final action in June 2003.  Final Rule,
71 Fed. Reg. at 17373.
5. 16 U.S.C. § 1853(c).
Photograph of oil cleanup courtesy of Jon Fisher,
www.drr.net/Marine Photobank.
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Limited-Entry Statutory Scheme
Is Constitutional
Riley v. Rhode Island Department of Environ-
mental Management, 941 A.2d 198 (R.I. 2008). 
Terra Bowling, J.D. 
In a constitutional challenge to Rhode Island’s
limited-entry fishing licensing scheme, the
Rhode Island Supreme Court has held that
statutory limits on entry into the state’s fishery
do not the violate the right to pursue a lawful
occupation or the right to a free fishery. 
Background
When Steven Riley applied to the Rhode Island
Department of Environmental Management
(DEM) for a principal effort fishing license, the
department denied his application, citing the
fact that Riley did not have a prior license.
Rhode Island’s Commercial Fishing Licenses
Act of 2000 allows only those holding a valid
principal-effort or multipurpose license before
December 31, 2002 to receive a “new” principal-
effort license.1
Although the Department denied Riley’s
application for the principal effort license, it
approved Riley for another, less lucrative, entry-
level commercial fishing license. Despite this,
Riley filed suit, claiming that his constitutional
rights were violated because the entry-level
license did not give him the same rights to fish
for the same species as other commercial fisher-
men. The lower court granted summary judg-
ment in favor of the DEM. 
Right to Pursue a Lawful Occupation
On appeal, the court first addressed Riley’s
claim that the denial of the preferred license
violated the Due Process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment by denying his funda-
mental right to pursue a common occupation of
life. The court looked at whether a fundamental
right was, in fact, involved. 
The court recognized that the “liberty” pro-
vision in the due process clause includes “the
right of the individual to engage in the common
occupations of life . . .”2 However, in this
instance, the court found that the statute did not
restrict Riley’s right to pursue the occupation of
commercial fisherman, given that he was grant-
ed a commercial fishing license. The fact that
the license was less lucrative than the one he
sought did not matter. The license he was
approved for enabled him to harvest more than a
hundred species of fish and other sea creatures. 
Because no fundamental right was involved,
Riley had to prove that there was a violation of
substantive due process, which requires a plain-
tiff to prove that the law is “clearly arbitrary and
unreasonable, having no substantial relation to
the public health, safety, morals, or general wel-
fare.”3 Riley was unable to prove that the law
was arbitrary and unreasonable. The court
noted that limiting the fishery to those who pos-
sessed a license prior to 2002 “has a real and
substantial relationship to a legitimate govern-
mental goal of limiting the number of licenses
available to take restricted species.”4
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Right of Fishery 
Next, the court examined whether a fundamen-
tal constitutional right of fishery was implicated
in the case. The court noted that the Rhode
Island constitution guaranteed the “rights of
fishery” to the people of the state.5 Furthermore,
the state courts have consistently held “that the
right of fishery in Rhode Island belongs to the
general public, and to no particular individ-
ual.”6 However, the court did examine whether
the General Assembly acted within its power
granted to it by the state constitution in regulat-
ing the fishery. 
Riley argued that because the statute only
allowed some commercial fishermen to take
restricted species, it denied other citizens equal
access to the fishery in violation of their consti-
tutional rights. Essentially, Riley thought that
the right of equal access required that “either
everyone is permitted to harvest the same
species, or no one is.”7 The court disagreed, not-
ing that taking “equal access” literally was
inconsistent to the court’s holdings that no fun-
damental right is implicated when the General
Assembly enacts legislation for the “good of the
whole,” at the expense of a few. 
Pursuant to the equal protection clause, leg-
islative actions that do not affect a fundamental
right or suspect class, such as race or national
origin, are subject to a “minimal scrutiny”
analysis. Under minimal
scrutiny, a statute merely
has to bear a reasonable rela-
tionship to public health,
safety, or welfare. Riley ar-
gued that because there
were other interstate regu-
lations in place limiting the
poundage of species that
could be harvested, the
state statues limiting entry
into the fishery were unnec-
essary. The court had to
determine whether limiting
entry into the fishery was a
rational means to achieve a
legitimate goal. The court
noted that preserving the state’s natural
resources for the good of the whole was a not
only a legitimate goal, but a constitutional
duty of the General Assembly. Furthermore,
regulating the access to different species of fish
was a rational means of protecting not only the
viability of the stocks and the fishing industry,
but also was for the well-being of the people of
the state.
Conclusion
The court upheld the statutory scheme as con-
stitutional, finding that the objectives of the
statutory scheme are legitimate and limiting
the entry of new licenses is a rational way to
achieve the goal of preserving the state’s
marine fisheries.
Endnotes
1.  R.I. GEN LAWS § 20-2.2-5(1)(i) (2008).
2.  Riley v. R.I. Dep’t of Envtl. Mgmt., 941 A.2d
198, 206 (R.I. 2008)
3.  Id. at 207. 
4.  Id.
5.  R.I. Const. art. 1, sec. 17. 
6.  Riley, 941 A.2d 198, 208. 
7.  Id. at 210.
Limited Entry, from page 13
Photograph of commercial fishermen courtesy of NOAA’s National Marine Fisheries Service.
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Minnesota Court of Appeals
Dismisses Nonprofit’s Suit
Save our Creeks v. City of Brooklyn Park, 2008
Minn. App. Unpub. Lexis 175 (Minn. Ct. App.
2008). 
Sara Wilkinson, 3L, University of Mississippi
In a recent decision, the Court of Appeals of
Minnesota dismissed claims brought against
the city of Brooklyn Park by a nonprofit corpo-
ration concerned with the effects of a residential
development on an area creek and wetlands.
The nonprofit, Save Our Creeks, alleged that
the city acted arbitrarily and capriciously when
it denied a request for further environmental
review of the development. 
Background
The claims brought by Save Our Creeks arose in
June 2003, when several individuals, including
William Barton, petitioned the Minnesota
Environmental Quality Board (MEQB) for fur-
ther environmental review of several pending
residential development projects planned by
Brooklyn Park. Barton and the petitioners were
concerned that the development would nega-
tively affect Oxbow Creek and its surrounding
wetlands. In turn, the MEQB designated the
city of Brooklyn Park as the responsi-
ble governmental unit (RGU) charged
with deciding the need for further
environmental review. Brooklyn
Park, as the RGU, determined that fur-
ther environmental review in the form
of an Environmental Assessment
Worksheet (EAW) and/or an
Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS), was not required for the projects
in the subject area and denied Barton’s
petition. 
After Brooklyn Park denied his
petition, Barton formed Save Our
Creeks to dispute the city’s decision.
Subsequently, Save Our Creeks filed a com-
plaint for declaratory judgment against
Brooklyn Park in August 2003, claiming the
actions were in violation of the Minnesota
Environmental Policy Act (MEPA) when it
denied Barton’s petition for environmental
review because several projects in Brooklyn
Park met the mandatory EIS requirement. The
nonprofit later added a claim alleging that
Brooklyn Park violated the Minnesota
Environmental Rights Act (MERA) when it
refused further environmental review of the res-
idential development near Oxbow Creek.1
Both parties moved for summary judgment.
The district court denied Save Our Creek’s
motion for summary judgment. The district
court denied Brooklyn Park’s summary judg-
ment motion with respect to the MEPA and
MERA claims but granted summary judgment
as to all other claims. 
At the close of trial, the district court grant-
ed Brooklyn Park’s motion to dismiss, conclud-
ing that Save Our Creeks did not meet its bur-
den of proof by a preponderance of the evi-
dence. The district court noted that no testimo-
ny was offered to support or explain any of the
See Save Our Creeks, page 16
Photograph of Oxbow Creek courtesy of Bill Barton of “Save Our Creeks.”
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admitted exhibits nor was any testimony
offered to show that Brooklyn Park’s decisions
were arbitrary or capricious or that protected
waters were encroached upon.2 Save Our Creeks
appealed the district court’s decision. 
EIS or EAW?
In its appeal, Save Our Creeks argued that dis-
missal of its MEPA claim was improper because
Save Our Creeks presented evidence showing
that Brooklyn Park acted arbitrarily and capri-
ciously when it denied its request for further
environmental review as required under MEPA.
Save Our Creeks contended that further envi-
ronmental review was required in the form of an
EIS because the residential development pro-
jects: 1) eliminated a protected water or wet-
land; and 2) consisted of a project area that
included over 1,500 units.
Minnesota law3 sets forth the criteria for
determining when an EIS and an EAW must be
prepared by an RGU for a proposed project.
According to Minnesota law, an EIS must be
prepared when the proposed project has the
potential for significant environmental effects
resulting from any major governmental action.
According to the law, an EAW is required when
there is material evidence showing that the pro-
ject may have the potential for significant envi-
ronmental effects. 4
Save Our Creeks contended that further
environmental review was warranted because
Oxbow Creek is a Department of Natural
Resources (DNR) protected water, and there-
fore the preparation of an EIS was required. To
meet the threshold requirement for an EIS, Save
Our Creeks had to establish that Oxbow Creek
is a statutorily defined protected water or wet-
land under Minnesota law5 and that the disput-
ed development projects would have eliminated
Oxbow Creek. 
At trial, Save Our Creeks submitted an
exhibit identifying protected DNR waters in
Hennepin County and a list outlining the pro-
tected waters and wetlands in that area from
1984. The list of protected waters did not specif-
ically list Oxbow Creek as a protected water,
and Save Our Creeks did not provide testimony
to establish that Oxbow Creek was one of the
identified unnamed protected waters on the list.
The court pointed out that even if Oxbow Creek
had been identified as a DNR-protected water
in 1984, Save Our Creeks was still required to
establish that Oxbow Creek met the statutory
definition of a protected water or wetland at the
time of its 2003 petition. The Minnesota Court
of Appeals agreed with the district court’s con-
clusion that the nonprofit did not provide suffi-
cient evidence that the actions would encroach
on protected waters.
Number of Units in Project
On appeal, Save Our Creeks incorrectly assert-
ed that an EIS was required because the resi-
dential development project area concerned
more than 1,500 attached and unattached units.
According to Minnesota Law, an EIS must be
prepared if the residential development
includes 1,000 unattached units or 1,500
attached units for certain metropolitan RGUs.
Further, multiple projects and multiple states of
a single project that are connected actions or
phased actions must be considered in total when
comparing the project or projects to determine
whether an EIS is necessary.6
One of Brooklyn Park’s city planners stated
in an affidavit to support Brooklyn Park’s sum-
mary judgment motion that the total project
area consisted of 1,590 units. Save Our Creeks
argued that the affidavit constituted an admis-
sion that the developments met the threshold
requirement to mandate an EIS. However, the
Save Our Creeks, from page 15
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affidavit identified a project area consisting of
36 individual development projects, which indi-
vidually consisted of too few units to meet the
mandatory EIS threshold. As a result, to estab-
lish that an EIS is necessary, Save Our Creeks
must show that the separate development pro-
jects located in the project area in the city plan-
ner’s affidavit were connected actions.
At trial, Save Our Creeks did not provide
any testimony or other evidence to establish
that the project area identified in the affidavit
consisted of developments that are connected
actions that met the mandatory EIS thresh-
old. As such, Save Our Creeks did not estab-
lish that an EIS was mandatory and thus did
not meet its burden of proof to show that
Brooklyn Park’s actions in denying its peti-
tion for further environmental review were
arbitrary and capricious. 
Conclusion
Save Our Creeks failed to establish that
Brooklyn Park acted arbitrarily and capricious-
ly when the city did not require further envi-
ronmental review of certain residential develop-
ments in the form of an EIS or EAW. Essentially,
Save Our Creeks did not introduce sufficient
evidence establishing Oxbow Creek as a DNR
protected water, due in large part to a procedur-
al error.7 Accordingly, the Minnesota Court of
Appeals upheld the district court’s decision
allowing the city of Brooklyn Park to continue
residential development projects in the Oxbow
Creek area.
Endnotes
1.   After extended litigation as to whether Save
Our Creeks could proceed because a non-
attorney signed its initial pleadings, Save
Our Creeks filed an amended complaint on
March 30, 2006.
2.   At the 2006 trial, only Barton testified. One
month prior to trial, Save Our Creeks filed
a witness list that included several lay and
expert witnesses not previously identified
before the discovery deadline. Thus, the
district court granted Brooklyn Park’s
motion to exclude all but Barton’s testimo-
ny at trial. 
3.   MINN. STAT. § 116D.04 (2a); In previous
holdings, the Minnesota Court of Appeals
has stated that material evidence is evi-
dence that is admissible, relevant and con-
sequential to determine whether the project
may have the potential for significant envi-
ronmental effects.
4.  Watab Twp. Citizen Alliance v. Benton County
Bd. of Comm’rs, 728 N.W.2d 82, 90 (Minn.
App. 2007).
5.  MINN. STAT. § 103G.005, subds. 15-15a.
6.  A connected action exists when the RGU
determines that two projects are related
because: 1) one project would directly
induce the other; 2) one project is a prereq-
uisite for the other; or 3) neither pro-
ject is justified by itself.  
7.  See supra note 2.
Photograph of Oxbow Creek courtesy of Dell Erickson of “Save
Our Creeks.”
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EPA authorization before adopting “standards
and other requirements relating to the control
of emission from … vehicles or engines.” PMSA
again argued that the regulations were preempt-
ed by the CAA, as well as the Submerged Lands
Act.
The board first argued that § 209(e)(2)
applies only to new engines and the Marine
Vessel Rules only apply to non-new engines,
therefore, the rules were not preempted. The
court disagreed, relying on a D.C. Circuit case
holding that the preemption of § 209(e)(2)
applies to both new and non-new engines. 
Next, the Board argued that the Marine
Vessel Rules were not emissions standards sub-
ject to § 209(e)(2), but, instead, were “in use
requirements” under §
209(d), which are not
subject to preemption.
The court concluded
that the rules were in
fact emissions stan-
dards. Because the rules
subject the engines to
precise quantifications,
the Marine Vessel Rules
“fit within the . . . defi-
nition of ‘standards’ as
a requirement that a
‘vehicle or engine must
not emit more than a
certain amount of a
given pollutant.’”1 The
court also concluded
that the Marine Vessel
Rules were not mere “in
use requirements” under § 209(d). Under
209(d), states may enact in use requirements to
“control, regulate, or restrict the use, operation,
or movement of licensed motor vehicles.” The
EPA has extended this allowance to the regula-
tion of nonroad engines, including marine ves-
sels. The Board argued that the Marine Vessel
Rules met the definition of an in use require-
ment, because they regulated the sulfur content
of the fuel in marine vessels. However, the court
found that the plain language of the rules regu-
lated emissions and not fuel content. 
Conclusion
In this instance, the court found that the regu-
lations were emissions standards and were
therefore preempted by the § 209(e)(2) of the
CAA. California will be required to obtain EPA
authorization prior to enforcing the Marine
Vessel Rules. The court did not address preemp-
tion under the Submerged Lands Act.
Endnotes
1. Pacific Merchant Shipping Association v.
Goldstene, 517 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2008).
Emissions, from page 4
Photograph of ocean-going ship courtesy of ©Nova Development Corp.
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Twin Bridge Marine Park, LLC v. Dep’t of
Ecology, 162 Wn.2d 825 (Wash. 2008). 
Terra Bowling, J.D. 
The issue of regulatory authority over coastal
development permits in Washington State came
to a head over the construction of a dry-storage
marina. The Supreme Court of Washington
ruled that local governments have the exclusive
authority to approve substantial development
permits (SDP). Furthermore, the only recourse
for the State Department of Ecology to chal-
lenge an SDP is through the Washington Land
Use Petition Act (LUPA). 
Background
The Washington State Shoreline Management
Act (SMA) regulates development on state
shorelines. Under the SMA, local governments
must develop shoreline management plans
(SMP) that are approved by the Department.
The counties then have the primary responsibil-
ity for administering the permit program and
ensuring compliance with their SMPs.
In 1975, Skagit County, Washington
approved a final environmental impact state-
ment (FEIS) for Twin Bridge Marine Park,
LLC, to construct an office, a warehouse, and
marine facilities on its property. In 1982, the
county issued two shoreline SDPs to Twin
Bridge for the development. The company later
decided to convert its business into a dry-stor-
age marina, and, in 2000, the county issued an
FEIS addendum to the 1975 FEIS, determining
that the dry-land marina development would
not have a significant adverse impact on the
environment. The county issued two amended
building permits for the project. The city of
Anacortes appealed the permits under LUPA,
but the Department did not join in the appeal. 
After Twin Bridge began construction, the
Department issued a stop work order and
ordered the company to obtain a new substan-
tial development shoreline permit. When the
company did not stop construction, the
Department issued a $17,000 penalty. The com-
pany appealed the decision to the Shorelines
Hearings Board (Board). Skagit County subse-
quently reevaluated the project and decided to
require new SDPs and suspended the amended
building permits. Twin Bridge stopped work on
the project. 
After applying to the county for new per-
mits, the company reached a settlement agree-
ment in which the Department withdrew its
penalty. The company also reached a separate
agreement with the county and Anacortes with
regard to the LUPA challenge. The county then
reinstated the building permits and Twin
Bridge resumed construction. The county
issued a final shoreline permit incorporating
local, state, and federal permits for the site. The
Department refused to recognize the permits,
reinstated the penalty of $17,000 and tacked on
an additional $17,000 penalty. Despite this,
Twin Bridge completed construction and
opened for business. The Department then
issued a third, $25,000 penalty. Twin Bridge
appealed the penalties to the Board, which
upheld the penalties. 
On appeal, the superior court reversed the
Board’s decision, finding that the county’s
issuance of the building permits and the FEIS
addendum resulted in county authorization for
the project. Furthermore, an additional permit
from the Department was not necessary, since
the county had concluded that the project was
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in compliance with the Shoreline Management
Act (SMA). And, finally, the Department could
not penalize projects with valid county permits
without first filing a LUPA challenge. In effect,
the Department’s issuance of penalties result-
ed in an invalid collateral attack on the coun-
ty’s decision. 
The Washington Court of Appeals affirmed
the ruling. The Department appealed the deci-
sion to the Washington State Supreme Court.
The key issue considered on appeal was whether
the Department could impose penalties under
the SMA when the project had been constructed
pursuant to valid county permits.
Authority under the SMA
First, the court noted that the SMA does not
give the Department the authority to directly
review a local government’s decision to issue an
SDP. However, the Department may review
other permits under the SMA, such as a condi-
tional use permit. The Department argued that
the dry-land marina exceeded the impact fore-
seen by the original permits, and, thus, the
county wrongly concluded that SDPs were the
appropriate permits. The court disagreed, find-
ing that “it is counterintuitive that a dry-storage
facility would have more shoreline impact than
a water marina.” Additionally, because the
county had two EISs it had the best available
information for determining the appropriate
permit. For those reasons, the court found that
the county’s characterization of the permits
would control. 
Next, the court turned to the issue of
whether the Department had the authority
to impose penalties on Twin Bridge. The
Department cited provisions of the SMA
that allow it to impose fines on those who
develop in shoreline areas without the prop-
er permits. The court noted that the compa-
ny had constructed the marina only after
reaching an agreement with the Department
that it would apply for a new SDP and then
obtaining those permits. In this instance,
the court found that Twin Bridge had
obtained all of the necessary permits, and
the Department could not impose penalties
on the company.
LUPA
The court turned to the Department’s regulato-
ry authority over local governments regarding
shoreline development. Relying on an analo-
gous case, Samuel’s Furniture v. Department of
Ecology,1 the court noted that under the SMA, a
local government and not the Department
makes the threshold determination of what
shoreline SDPs are required under the county’s
SMP. In Samuel’s Furniture, the court had deter-
mined that LUPA provided the appropriate
means for entities challenging a final land use
decision by a local authority. The court found
that the Department was required to comply
with LUPA in this instance as well, given that
this was a final land use decision issued by a
local authority, Skagit County.
LUPA stipulates that no “person” – includ-
ing entities like the Department – is exempt
from its provisions when challenging a final
land use decision by a local authority with juris-
diction. LUPA requires those opposing a final
land use decision to appeal that decision within
twenty-one days. In this instance, the
Department had notice of the county’s decision
and did not appeal. After twenty-one days
elapsed, the permits were valid and Twin Bridge
correctly relied on them. 
Conclusion
The court concluded that the disagreement with
the local permitting authority should have been
resolved through LUPA and not through penal-
ties assessed on Twin Bridge.2 The court af-
firmed the lower courts’ decisions and dis-
missed the Department’s fines and orders.
Endnotes
1.  147 Wn.2d 440 (Wash. 2002).
2.  Twin Bridge Marine Park, LLC v. Dep’t of
Ecology, 162 Wn.2d 825, 847 (Wash. 2008).
Shoreline Management Act, from page 19
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Will Wilkins, J.D.
What is copyright ownership?
In this series of articles, we have explored many
aspects of copyright law but have yet to address,
in more than a cursory fashion, some of the
most fundamental issues involving copyright
ownership such as: who owns the copyright in a
work and what does owning a copyright mean?
We will take on those issues here.
Let’s first review what can be copyrighted.
U.S copyright law delineates several types of
“works of authorship” which can be protected by
copyright. These include: literary works; musical
works; dramatic works; pantomimes and choreo-
graphic works; pictorial, graphic and sculptural
works; motion pictures and other audiovisual
works; sound recordings; and architectural works.
If a work does not fit into these categories it is not
protected by copyright law (though other means
of protection may be available).
So, assuming that there is an original work
of authorship, as defined above, then what
rights does the owner have in the work? In other
words, why are we so concerned about owner-
ship? Copyright ownership, like other types of
property ownership, carries with it some very
strong rights reserved to the owner of the prop-
erty. These rights include the right to copy the
work, to prepare other works based on the orig-
inal, to distribute copies, and to display or per-
form the work publicly. In copyright law, these
rights are known as “exclusive rights” which
means that the owner of the copyright rights not
only has the ability to do these things, he has the
ability to keep others from doing these things
with his works.
Who initially owns a copyright?
Generally speaking, the author or creator of a
work is the owner of the copyright. If the work
is a joint work, then the creators become co-
owners of the work. 
Easy enough, right? Not so fast. This gener-
al rule may not apply in the workplace, where,
in certain situations, the work will be termed a
“work made for hire,” and the copyright is
owned by the employer. There are two instances
where a work may become a “work made for
hire.” The first is when it is created by an
employee within the course and scope of his
employment. In other words, where an employ-
ee creates a work as a part of his job, then that
work will be owned by the employer.
Another type of work may also be a “work
made for hire” and thus owned by the employer.
It is a work that is specifically ordered or com-
missioned where the parties expressly agree in a
signed written document that the work is to be
a work made for hire. But, not all works qualify
under this category – it only applies to: contri-
butions to collective works; parts of motion pic-
tures or other audiovisual works; translations;
supplementary works; compilations; instruc-
tional texts; tests or answers; or atlases.
So the owner of the copyright is usually the
creator, unless the work is a work made for
hire (or unless the rights have been signed
away – more on that later). Keep in mind here,
though, that we are talking about ownership of
a copyright and not ownership of the physical
work itself. One aspect of copyright ownership
“But I Own It . . . I Think.” The
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that is very different than the ownership of other
types of property is that the copyright in a work
and the work itself are two entirely different
pieces of property and may be owned by differ-
ent individuals. For example, when you buy a
book in the bookstore, you clearly own the copy
of the book you bought, but you do not own the
copyright to that book. The copyright ownership
remains with the copyright holder, in this case,
usually the author or publisher.
Also, a special note is in order to those deal-
ing with universities or the federal government,
since both alter the relationship between cre-
ators and employers. Universities traditionally
waive any claim they might have to copyright
ownership of faculty and staff work, but often
reserve it in certain specific circumstances
involving, for instance, specifically commis-
sioned works or substantial uses of university
resources. In fact, there is no modern norm
regarding how universities determine copyright
ownership for works created on campuses, so
you must look at the internal policies of each on
a case by case basis.
Works created by federal government
employees are also special cases. Pursuant to
Section 105 of the copyright statutes, “[c]opy-
right protection under this title is not available
for any work of the United States Government,
but the United States Government is not pre-
cluded from receiving and holding copyrights
transferred to it by assignment, bequest, or oth-
erwise.” A work of the United States Gov-
ernment is defined as a work created by a gov-
ernment employee as part of his job. 
Transfers of copyright rights 
Copyright ownership, like ownership of physi-
cal property, can be transferred to another per-
son. This transfer must be in writing and must
be signed by the owner or his authorized agent. 
Similarly, copyright owners can allow others
to use exercise their copyright rights (to copy,
distribute, perform . . .). These permissions are
generally referred to as licenses. The best licens-
es clearly set forth – in writing - the parameters
of the permission. Owners can restrict such per-
missions to a certain period of time, to a certain
geographic boundary, or in any other imagin-
able way. 
Ownership matrix
The determination of copyright ownership is
important from a couple of perspectives. First,
if you are a creator of original works, it is crit-
ical to know if you will own the works you cre-
ate in different situations and whether you
need to enter into a written agreement to alter
these default outcomes set by U.S. copyright
law. Also, if you want to use someone else’s
works -say to reprint an article- you will need
to determine first who owns the copyright in
the work.
Though simplified here, I generally follow
the basic outline set forth above when working
through copyright ownership issues. First, own-
ership generally vests in the creator unless it
was a work for hire. If it might be a work for
hire, I ask if there is there a chance there is a
university or federal government employee
involved. By answering these questions, you
have at least a good start in finding the copy-
right owner.
Copyright, from page 21
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The Red Bird Reef, an artificial reef constructed from New York City’s subway cars off the coast of
Delaware, has been a huge success with fish and fishermen alike. The reef consists of over 700 cars
on the ocean floor and is populated by mussels, sponges, black sea bass, tautog, and flounder. Since
the reef was started several years ago, commercial
and recreational fishermen have flocked to the
area. Other states, such as New Jersey Maryland,
and Virginia, have also used New York’s subway
cars to build reefs. The growth of Delaware and
other states’ reefs may slow down this summer,
however, as state officials in New York are working
to get permits that would allow them to use the cars
for reefs off their own coast, according to The New
York Times.
A shipwrecked dog named Snickers and parrot
named Gulliver have been rescued and expect to
find new homes. The pets were aboard their own-
ers’ sailboat when it landed on a coral reef near a
tiny atoll 1,000 miles south of Hawaii. The owners swam to shore with Snickers and Gulliver, but
when the owners hitched a ride from the atoll on a cargo vessel, the pets were left in the care of
native islanders. In March, word spread that the animals would be
destroyed. A boating journal sent out an SOS and Norwegian
Cruise Line workers were able to rescue Snickers from the island.
Snickers was quarantined in Hawaii until he could be sent to his
new owner in Las Vegas. Plans to move Gulliver from the atoll to
nearby Christmas Island and later to Los Angeles are in place,
according to the Associated Press.
A missing Cape Cod lighthouse has shown up in California. The
lighthouse was thought to be destroyed in 1925, but it was actually
taken down by the Coast Guard and moved to the California coast.
The find was discovered by lighthouse researchers, who could not
uncover how or why the lighthouse was moved. The lighthouse is
still used as a navigational aid and hostel in Point Montara,
California, according to the Associated Press. 
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) is seeking comments on its pro-
posed authorization of the Navy’s mid-frequency sonar training exercises around the Hawaiian
Islands. Comments will be accepted through July 23. For more information, please visit 
http://www.noaanews.noaa.gov/stories2008/20080623_navysonar.html .
Graphic courtesy of ©Nova Development Corp.
Photograph of car used in artificial reef courtesy of NOAA’s coral
Kingdom Collection, photographer, Dr. James P. McVey, NOAA Sea
Grant Program.
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